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On February 26, 2018, the mayor of Oakland decided to give a warning to 
residents of the North Bay of an impending action by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement to find and arrest non-citizens for removal from the United States.  
Her office posted a statement on Twitter which among other things said, “My 
priority is for the well-being and safety of all residents—particularly our most 
vulnerable—and I know that Oakland is safer when we share information, 
encourage community awareness, and care for our neighbors.”1  Later on the same 
statement declares, “We understand ICE has used activity rumors in the past as a 
tactic to create fear; our intent is for our community to go about their daily lives 
without fear . . . .”2  When asked to explain, an NPR article quoted her response, 
“Schaaf said the city’s ‘law-abiding immigrants and families . . . deserve to live 
free from the constant threat of arrest and deportation’ and she considered it her 
duty and moral obligation . . . .”3 
On a public level, the resistance to the current immigration regime can be 
seen through journalists and commentators who write about the harsh 
consequences of deportation and detention.  New stories about sympathetic 
members of the community forced to be deported have become a staple of the 
media,4 and not just for the national media but local ones as well.5  Along with the 
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media, the focus on the unjust and oftentimes harsh consequences of deportation 
are gaining traction with national politicians as well.  Where once increased 
immigration enforcement was a bipartisan focus,6 the Democratic Party has 
apparently shifted,7 even enacting a short-lived government shutdown to support 
protection for childhood arrivals.8  The consensus for many on the left has been 
that the Trump Administration in its actions on the travel ban, coupled with other 
immigration policies are racist, bolstered by President Trump’s remarks during 
negotiations over DACA referring to countries from Africa and Haiti as 
“shitholes.”9  Democratic politicians have begun to take seriously the call for the 
abolition of ICE, and members of Congress have begun to explicitly endorse the 
defunding of ICE as an agency. 
Not only has attention been paid to who the system is deporting, but 
increasingly critical attention has been applied to the manner of removal.  For 
example, local attorneys in New York City staged a protest of ICE enforcement 
officers showing up in local criminal courts.10  Local churches and congregations 
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have offered “sanctuary” to those who fear deportation,11 even as these actions 
may bring criminal liability.12  A daughter of a sanctuary seeker explains the 
motivation to seek sanctuary, “They're telling you you have to turn yourself in 
because that's the law . . . [a]nd you're basically saying, ‘No, I’m not going to do 
that because it's not just—because I haven't done anything wrong.’”13 
On the local and state levels, resistance over deportation predated the 2016 
presidential election, and is best exhibited by the passage of ordinances, decrees, 
and even state laws designed to both disentangle themselves from the deportation 
system and to protect their immigrant communities from deportation.  “Sanctuary 
city” policies have been a reaction of the increasing pressure of the federal 
government to enlist local law enforcement in the deportation regime, and current 
efforts to create local policies of disentanglement has been because city officials 
believe that mass deportation causes harm to their communities, and that protecting 
against them is necessary, “to protecting fundamental rights, such as the right to 
live free from racial profiling, illegal searches and stops, and arrests lacking in 
probable cause.”14  Even in the face of threats to lose federal funding,15 and ICE 
officials openly suggesting that city officials that support sanctuary policies should 
be subject to criminal prosecution,16 state and local governments continue to pass 
laws intending to separate themselves with the deportation regime. 
The federal judiciary, specifically federal district courts, who after the REAL 
ID Act of 2005 were statutorily “walled off” from examining deportation orders, 
have become increasingly involved in deciding the legitimacy of the deportation 
system.  On January 29, 2018, Judge Katherine B. Forrest from the Southern 
District of New York issued an opinion that freed activist Ravi Ragbir who was 
detained and facing deportation.  In her opinion, Judge Forrest stated: 
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It ought not to be—and it has never before been—that those who have 
lived without incident in this country for years are subjected to treatment 
we associate with regimes we revile as unjust, regimes where those who 
have long lived in a country may be taken without notice from streets, 
home, and work.  And sent away.  We are not that country; and woe be 
the day that we become that country under a fiction that laws allow 
it . . . .  The wisdom of our Founders is evident in the document that 
demands and requires more; before the deprivation of liberty, there is due 
process; and an aversion to acts that are unnecessarily cruel.17 
 
This invocation of due process and the Constitution comes even as the court 
acknowledges that the statutory scheme invoked by the government authorizes the 
detention of Mr. Ragbir.  Other examples of federal judiciary actions to stop 
deportations of groups of people happened at a surprising rate in 2017 as four 
different district courts issued injunctions to stop deportations nationwide for 
Iraqis, Cambodians, and a more limited class to stop deportations of Indonesians 
and Somalis.18 
The condemnation of the deportation system, from the media, individual 
community leaders, politicians, and the judiciary has important consequences.  
Though deportations will likely continue, the increasingly common view of the 
system as morally unjust has the potential to cause conflict and undermine 
compliance and cooperation with the system.  This is one reason that ICE director 
Thomas Homan has condemned local politicians and even called for their arrest in 
supporting “sanctuary” policies, citing risks to ICE agents and requiring the 
increased use of resources, going so far as to promise more enforcement in areas 
that attempt to express disagreement on deportations through sanctuary policies or 
declarations.19 
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While the media and politicians generally decry the cruelty of the system, 
academic critiques have mostly focused on the lack of procedural fairness in the 
deportation regime.  Scholars in the last fifteen years or so have begun to describe 
and raise the alarm over how the immigration system has increasingly begun to 
resemble the criminal justice system.20  The “modern” deportation system has 
increasingly adopted the tools and trappings of the criminal justice system.21  This 
increasing criminalization of immigration law has alarmed many scholars, 
especially as they point out the asymmetry of what has been incorporated.22  To 
many, this asymmetry exposed the fundamental unfairness of the system itself.23 
The academic focus on procedural fairness is not surprising given how one 
immigration judge described her job as imposing the death penalty in traffic 
court.24  The quote is remarkably evocative as one imagines the chaos and lax 
procedural protections in traffic court as having dire and severe consequences.  
Continuing research shows that perceptions of fairness directly affect views on 
legitimacy and therefore can promote or undermine compliance with the law.  Yet, 
while most attention has centered on the “traffic court” aspect of the quote, less 
academic interest has been drawn to the “death penalty” nature of the deportation 
system. 
Scholars have examined how the lack of moral credibility can undermine 
compliance with immigration law.  For example, Professor Emily Ryo examined 
the historical reasons why the Chinese continued to flout the Chinese Exclusion 
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laws and entered the borders through Mexico and Canada continuously.25  She 
concluded that Chinese attitudes towards the policy, such as perceptions of 
unfairness and racism, coupled with “opportunity structures,” helped fuel the lack 
of respect for immigration laws by the Chinese and led to unauthorized entry from 
both the Canadian and Mexican border.26  She also examined the attitudes of 
unauthorized migrants, concluding that their views on the system’s lack of 
legitimacy fuel non-compliance with immigration laws designed to prevent 
unauthorized migration.27 
What has not been discussed in as much detail, is how the deportation and 
detention regime violates moral credibility, and consequently how it lends to 
perceptions of unjustness.  Using some of Professor Ryo’s analysis, and her 
framework of “Neutralization” theory I conclude two primary features of a legal 
system will determine perceptions of moral legitimacy; (1) culpability, in other 
words are the blameworthy being punished and the innocent not, and (2) 
arbitrariness are the factors that decide punishment cognizable and not based on 
luck or illegitimate bases such as racism.  I examine the deportation systems under 
these two axis to help understand why the larger community and not just the 
subjects of deportation may view the systems as lacking moral credibility.  If the 
system violates a community’s norms for justice, then not only would it have 
difficulty encouraging compliance, but it would also face resistance from the 
community and hamper cooperation. 
I argue that the deportation system’s lack of moral credibility is one reason 
that it has produced increased resistance on the local and state level.  While focus 
should continue on the system’s lack of procedural protections and adjudication 
norms, a detailed examination of whether and how the deportation system lacks 
moral credibility in the punishment context is overdue.  I argue that components of 
a just punishment system would include a proper consideration of culpability and 
would avoid arbitrariness.  However, after identifying how the deportation system 
lacks moral credibility, I conclude that the only viable option is for the system is to 
abandon two features of deportation that only recently have become major features 
of the system; removals based on crime and the use of detention. 
Using the criminal system to make proxy judgements on those deserving or 
not of deportation undermines the moral framework of deportation.  The criminal 
system has jurisdiction over all people, citizens and non-citizens alike, and 
imposing deportation (and detention) as a direct consequence of criminal activity 
necessarily imposes a new tier of punishment.  However, this new tier of 
punishment is only applicable to non-citizens and if we take seriously the role of 
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the criminal system in imposing moral norms, creates an untenable situation that 
forces non-citizens to conduct themselves by a completely different set of norms 
than do citizens, without any justification other than “citizens” are immune. 
Part I of the article will outline the importance of moral credibility in 
promoting compliance and cooperation with the law.  I will also describe two main 
features of a morally credible system—whether it considers questions of 
culpability and arbitrariness.  Part II will examine two troublesome features of the 
deportation system: removal of “criminal” deportees to countries of origin (or 
citizenship) and detention of non-citizens in the deportation system.  Finally, in 
Part III I argue that the use of detention and criminal based removals are 
incompatible for a just, and therefore an ultimately workable system of deportation 
and removal. 
 
I. THE ROAD TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS OF REMOVAL 
 
Those found guilty of a criminal offense can be substantially deprived of their 
life, liberty, or property.  For example, one could be sentenced to death when 
found guilty of committing a particularly heinous crime.28  The taking of these 
liberties are legitimized by the underlying theoretical principle that these 
punishments serve a legitimate function of government.  Even under civil law, 
punishments can include the loss of one’s business, ability to be employed in one’s 
career, one’s home, and one’s savings (through the imposition of fines).  What 
social science research is showing in increasingly clear ways, is that in order to 
meet the goals of either criminal or civil punishment efficiently, the punishment 
must be viewed as legitimate.29  In order for a punitive system to be legitimate, it 
must both be procedurally fair and have moral credibility.30 
One of the key components of effective punishment is its ability to impose a 
social norm to follow the rules and commands of the system—even if there may be 
some ambiguity as to the individual rule that is being imposed.  For instance, when 
the law sets an age requirement of 21 for people to drink lawfully, the general 
norm of rule compliance should win out even over those who think that 19 or 20 
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year olds should be allowed to drink.  As social science has shown, the fear of 
punishment, and its severity, is ineffective in creating those norms—while 
alignment with community views of morality have been found to be far more 
effective.31  The social norm of compliance expresses itself in the system through 
the creation of a stigma.32  The stigmatizing effect does more than just ensure 
compliance of those subject to the law, but it also creates cooperation between 
communities and law enforcement.  For instance, community institutions are far 
more likely to help detect and even apprehend law-breakers that are properly 
stigmatized.  However, stigma can only be created if the law does not violate the 
moral credibility with the community.33 
 
A. Utility of Desert, and the Procedural Justice Model 
 
The question of how to foster compliance with the law has been one of the 
central inquiries in criminology, but has not just been the province of lawyers, but 
also psychologists and sociologists as well.  Tom R. Tyler’s book Why People 
Obey the Law, used a survey designed to ascertain the attitudes of Chicago’s 
residents on compliance with the law and its legitimacy.  Much of the literature 
that came before focused on what he described as the “instrumental” model of law 
compliance—namely “people are viewed as shaping their behavior to respond to 
changes in the tangible, immediate incentives . . . gains and losses resulting from 
different kinds of behavior.  In other words, “increasing the severity and certainty 
of punishment for committing a crime has frequently been viewed as an effective 
way of reducing the rate at which the crime is committed.”34  Professor Tyler, 
based on his survey findings and analysis concluded that the instrumental model 
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was insufficient, and that normative models were often much more influential in 
shaping compliance with the law. 
A normative model can be summed up as: 
 
[i]f people view compliance with the law as appropriate because of their 
attitudes about how they should behave, they will voluntarily assume the 
obligation to follow legal rules.  They will feel personally committed to 
obeying the law, irrespective of whether they risk punishment for 
breaking the law.  This normative commitment can involve personal 
morality or legitimacy.  Normative commitment through personal 
morality means obeying a law because one feels the law is just; 
normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law because 
one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate 
behavior.35 
 
Since his book, others have gone on to show that “instrumental” views are 
less effective in fostering compliance than normative ones.36  Professor Tyler, 
when describing both normative models, discusses perceptions of fairness as 
associated with legitimacy and perception of morality. 
The legal scholar, Paul Robinson, has used Professor Tyler and other 
researchers to make the argument that the normative instrument’s morality aspect 
fits well with a view of “retributive” model of criminal punishment.  In attempting 
to bridge the long-running conflict over whether criminal law should concern itself 
primarily with utilitarian concerns or with punishment, Professor Robinson has 
posited his theory of “the utility of desert.”37  Just as Professor Tyler talked of the 
benefits of self-regulation, Professor Robinson argued that the best way to 
accomplish many of the utilitarian goals of criminal punishment, would be to 
ensure that it also conforms to a communal sense of justice, namely punishing 
those who deserve punishment according to the severity of their transgressions.  As 
he writes: 
 
The criminal law’s power in nurturing and communicating societal 
norms and its power to have people defer to it in unanalyzed cases is 
directly proportional to criminal law’s moral credibility.  If 
criminalization or conviction (or decriminalization or refusal to convict) 
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is to have an effect in the norm-nurturing process, it will be because the 
criminal law has a reputation for criminalizing and punishing only that 
which deserves moral condemnation, and for decriminalizing and not 
punishing that which does not.  If, instead, the criminal law’s reputation 
is one simply of a collection of rules, which do not necessarily reflect the 
community’s perceptions of moral blameworthiness, then there would be 
little reason to expect the criminal law to be relevant to the societal 
debate over what is and is not condemnable and little reason to defer to it 
as a moral authority.38 
 
Professor Robinson accepted the general premise of Professor Tyler’s work in 
recognizing the two modes of normative analysis, but he goes on to argue that one 
mode is more important.  Robinson argues that moral credibility likely has a 
stronger effect of creating compliance to the law than a system with procedural 
protections, and pointed to Professor Tyler’s own results from the Chicago study 
for support.39  Professor Robinson agreed that procedural fairness, and thus 
legitimacy, has a strong and important role in compliance decisions, but he argued 
both pragmatically and theoretically that moral credibility plays the more 
important role. 
This position finds support from the work of sociologist Malcolm Feeley.  In 
The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court, he 
argued that even in the absence of procedural justice, a criminal system can still 
produce substantive justice.40  While most immigration legal scholars tend to 
discuss and focus on the lack of, or need to improve the procedural protections for 
those placed in the removal system, there hasn’t been as much corresponding focus 
on the moral credibility (substantive justness) of the system. 
Not only does normative views of the system help foster compliance under 
the law, but it also serves an important interest in community involvement to both 
detect and catch lawbreakers.  On the other hand, if the set of laws are viewed by 
the community as not morally credible, it “may provoke resistance and subversion, 
and may lose its capacity to harness powerful social and normative influence.”41  A 
communal sense of moral justice helps foster social norms of compliance and 
shared responsibility against law breaking.  Because people are far more likely to 
comport themselves to certain norms of behavior if they believe that actions are 
socially (un)acceptable, a morally credible system helps set social norms that can 
                                                                                                                                 
38  Id. at 477. 
39  Bowers & Robinson, supra note 30, at 278 n.310. 
40  MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER 
CRIMINAL COURT 283 (Russell Sage Foundation ed., 1992).  He argued that despite the lack of 
procedural norms in the misdemeanor courts, actors were often still able to come to substantive 
results that complied with notions of justice. 
41  Bowers & Robinson, supra note 30, at 212. 
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propagate even close calls or ambiguous situations.  Moral credibility works by 
creating a social stigma against non-compliance, which can only be effective if the 
overall system is viewed as a moral authority.42  Not only is it important to make 
sure that subjects of the law comply with its dictates, but it goes further, creating 
norms and shared responsibility by the community to enforce the law.  Without the 
stigma and a shared sense of responsibility, or even worse a system that violates a 
communal sense of justice, the likely result is the creation of resistance and active 
undermining of law enforcement.  The operation of the legal system relies on the 
cooperation of “the system’s witnesses, jurors, police, prosecutors, judges, 
offenders, and others.”43 
 
B. Application of Normative Instruments to Immigration Law 
 
Emily Ryo’s body of work has applied the lessons of Tom Tyler and others to 
the area of immigration law in both interesting and important ways.  She has 
examined the subjective attitudes of unauthorized migrants from Mexico and 
Central America, both before and after their entry44 and showed that authorized 
migrants tend to have sophisticated systems of moral judgment on the immigration 
system that prevents and punishes them from entering with status.45  Moreover, she 
has even gotten into the historical record to attempt to ascertain the attitudes of 
Chinese Immigrants who crossed without authorization during the Chinese 
Exclusion Era.46  Essentially, she has managed to view two different population 
groups who flouted the same type of immigration restrictions, despite their 
existence in completely different historical periods. She has taken the important 
task of examining what these two groups’ normative views were on the laws that 
were preventing them from entering the United States. 
These studies managed to show that both groups, the Chinese migrants and 
modern migrants from Mexico and Central America, had strong reasons to feel 
their exclusion was unjust and unfair.  The survey results were clear; both groups 
felt that their exclusion was unjust, was motivated by racism, and was therefore 
worth fighting against.  The Chinese had no reservations about continually 
crossing over, dressing in disguises, and resorting to extreme measures to enter 
clandestinely.  The more a group felt that the laws were unfair, the higher the 
likelihood of making an unauthorized entry.  The results were widespread non-
compliance. 
                                                                                                                                 
42  Id. at 217. 
43  Id. 
44  Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CALIF. L. 
REV. 999, 1016–18 (2017).  See also Ryo, supra note 27. 
45  Ryo, supra note 44, at 1024–34. 
46  Ryo, supra note 27. 
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Professor Ryo had another study that examined something other than the 
system of exclusion, but rather delved into the attitudes of those being deported.  
This study examined the attitudes of detainees held in an Orange County Jail 
holding ICE detainees awaiting deportation.47  While this study did not attempt to 
measure compliance, it did attempt to discern the potential for legal cynicism.48  I 
will examine in more detail this study infra but it is an important start to the 
questioning of whether our system of deportation—not just exclusion—has moral 
credibility.  It is important to note at the onset, that evaluating the moral credibility 
of the deportation system has slightly different challenges than in the criminal or 
even in the immigration exclusion context. 
When examining compliance with the law in criminal terms, it is easy to 
understand why the “communal” sense of moral credibility would be members of 
the entire community.  Everyone is subject to our criminal justice system.  In fact, 
any immunity or exclusion would likely lead to moral outrage.  When examining 
the rules on exclusion, it is easy to confine the analysis to those who are actually 
excluded.  This is the population that these laws were targeting, and perhaps more 
importantly also the ones which the people were deciding whether to violate.  
However, an examination of the moral credibility of deportation does not appear to 
be easy to answer on whose attitudes are most important.  The compliance of those 
subject to potential deportation seem to be more difficult to conceptualize.  
Because many of the violations that lead to deportation are already inextricably 
intertwined with rules of exclusion, the question of whether deportation is morally 
credible can be blurred with whether the exclusionary rules are morally just.  One 
example would be the deportation of those who entered without authorization.  
What is unjust, their inability to enter the United States given a lack of visas for 
certain populations such as Mexicans and Central Americans?  Or is the system 
that requires their removal?  Another example could include the deportation of 
those who entered fraudulently, but again this is intertwined with the exclusionary 
process as presumably they only entered with fraud because they could not enter 
otherwise. 
This does not mean there aren’t ways to decide which communal attitudes are 
important.  First, there is compliance with the deportation process, i.e. do people 
go to their court hearings, do they comply with orders of removal, and do they 
report when required.  Second, the views on moral credibility and legitimacy are 
not confined to the group most affected.  Tom Tyler and his colleagues examined 
police behavior towards Muslim Americans and concluded that acceptance of the 
role of moral credibility goes beyond controlling potential lawbreakers, but also to 
the community actors who are instrumental in enforcing the law.49  This spillover 
                                                                                                                                 
47  Ryo, supra note 43, at 1016–19. 
48  Id. 
49  Aziz Z. Huq, Tom Tyler & Stephen Schulhofer, Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law 
Enforcement?  The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 
419, 427 (2011). 
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effect is important, for it means that the subjective notions of moral credibility 
should not be only confined to those who the law seeks to control. 
The role of communal actors has taken on an increasingly large burden in 
terms of the deportation system.  The logistical difficulties and resource restraints 
on federal actors have caused the enlistment of state and local law enforcement, 
and community institutions in an effort to help detect, and detain those who may 
be subject to deportation.  The ability to harness the community’s norm setting 
power, much less the increased availability of resources for detection and 
apprehension, requires cooperation, which in turn requires accepting that the 
system that is being assisted is in fact morally credible.  In deciding which 
communal norms to examine, the decision must be the larger society’s norms.50  
While  a survey of views by the public on the deportation system would be 
instructive, in the absence of such an effort, distilling common features of what a 
just system should include can be a sufficient means of evaluating the moral 
credibility of the deportation system when examining society overall.  However, I 
recognize that this endeavor may seem more akin to what Professor Robinson 
deemed to be a deontological view of moral justice, rather than the “empirical 
desert” view that takes actual account of community norms.51  I accept this 
potential criticism, though I have endeavored to try and cast the questions about 
the moral norms less in terms of whether a particular practice or outcome is unjust, 
but rather when the outcome is devoid of considerations that are important to a just 
system. 
 
C. What Dimensions Must be Considered in Order to be Morally Credible? 
 
While many different contours affect the moral credibility of a punishment or 
justice system, there are two main features that a system must match community 
and perceptions in order to gain credibility.  The first involves culpability: i.e., the 
punishment must fit the crime, which also includes the avoidance of punishing the 
blameless.  Second, the system must not be arbitrary—punishment must be rational 
and not illegitimate. 
Focus on these two features for establishing moral credibility is warranted by 
their relationship to what Professor Ryo describes as “Neutralization” Research.  
According to researchers, in order to break the law, there are several types of 
“rationalizations” used by people in order to justify their decision.52  Examining 
the rationalization used by non-compliant people helps explain what norms are 
inherently required in order to be viewed as morally credible.  In other words, what 
features or lack of features would make it easier to rationalize becoming 
                                                                                                                                 
50  Ingrid Eagly, Criminal Justice for Non-Citizens: An Analysis of Variations in Criminal 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013). 
51  Bowers & Robinson, supra note 30, at 216. 
52  Ryo, supra note 27, at 641. 
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noncompliant.  In Professor Ryo’s study of unauthorized migrants inside the 
United States she found some common attitudes.  First were the attempts by the 
migrants to cast themselves as unworthy of blame—either through a lack of 
volition, or loyalty to their family and their needs.53  For example, one subject 
explained, “When I came over, I made my decision because I have two sons and I 
am a single mother,” she continues by explaining that her job was not enough to 
pay for her children’s education.54  Migrants explained that they caused no injury 
and that they did not take jobs or opportunities from U.S. Citizens.55  Second, they 
pointed out that the immigration system either favored the rich, was racially biased 
or arbitrary.56  Roughly, both types of objections fit into our notions of punishing 
only those who deserve it—culpability, and avoiding arbitrary and illegitimate 
outcomes. 
 
D. What Is Meant by Culpability and Proportionality? 
 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution requires punishment to be 
proportional.57  Scholars state that there are two elements that need to be assessed 
to determine blameworthiness: (1) the nature and seriousness of the crime, and (2) 
culpability (discussed below).58  An underlying justification for having the 
punishment be proportionate is overall fairness to those involved in the system.59  
Thus, someone who commits a minor offense should not be subjected to the death 
penalty (which is typically reserved for the most heinous of crimes).  While jurists 
often agree that punishment should not be “grossly disproportionate” to the 
blameworthiness of the offender, there is not much consistency amongst jurists and 
scholars on how to determine if a punishment is “grossly disproportionate.”60  
Nonetheless, even if a particular disproportionate punishment can pass 
constitutional muster the overall system still must exhibit a structural reflection of 
proportionality expected by the community; being constitutional does not mean it 
is morally justified. 
                                                                                                                                 
53  Id. at 650–51. 
54  Id. at 651. 
55  Id. at 653. 
56  Id. at 657–63. 
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punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
58  Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005). 
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60  See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (2005). 
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One feature in modern criminal law that reflects the value of proportionality is 
mens rea.  Mens rea is the recognition that an individual’s motivation and 
knowledge should affect their culpability and therefore the level of punishment.  A 
classic example of mens rea’s reflection on proportionality and culpability is with 
homicide.  For example, research has suggested that individuals have typically 
agreed with the tendency “ . . . in the modern legal codes to distinguish grades of 
offenses within as well as between offenses, and typically favored additional 
grading distinctions not made by the Code.”61  Differences in grading is 
appropriate for murder; an individual who intended to kill should receive a higher 
sentence than one who killed recklessly or negligently.  Thus, the sentence one 
receives should be in proportion to the offender’s moral blameworthiness.  If one is 
convicted of a “higher” offense, such as First-Degree Murder, as opposed to 
Manslaughter, the offender should receive the higher sentence that correlates with 
the crime.  The modern legal codes take proportionality into account by punishing 
“greater” offenses harsher than “lesser” offenses (i.e. Felonies vs. Misdemeanors).  
While individual communities and systems can choose how and what can be 
considered as factors of proportionality, there must be a cogent system in place. 
Aside from proportionality, another important aspect of culpability is the 
ability to distinguish when conduct no longer becomes blameworthy and therefore 
should not be punished based on certain circumstances.  Culpability in this context 
is not the graduated scale of blameworthiness, but rather the binary question of 
whether a person should be punished at all.  Where proportionality assumes that a 
person is guilty of an offense, but requires that the punishment meted to be 
proportional to the seriousness of the crime, culpability in this context recognizes 
that in certain situations punishment is not warranted.  Evaluating the culpability 
requirement to determine the system’s moral credibility is essential, if the system 
punishes people that the community finds blameless than the law is unjust.62 
For example, the modern criminal justice system recognizes that there are 
certain people who due to either age or illness are blameless actors.  A person may 
be able to argue that their mental illness made their actions blameless—an insanity 
defense doesn’t merely downgrade guilt, it alleviates it entirely.63  Similarly, the 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act64 recognizes that no criminal liability can attach 
for children of a certain age who commit crimes.  The federal system views 12-
year-olds as incapable of criminal liability.65  Even as some state courts can 
occasionally allow for extraordinary cases that do attach criminal liability to young 
actors, the juvenile court system of most states also recognizes that children are by 
their nature not normally criminally liable. 
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62  Sara Taylor, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1810 (2012). 
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64  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42 (2012). 
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The justice system may also recognize that certain situations would justify 
what would otherwise be a crime.  For instance, defense of others, “stand your 
ground,” or duress defenses recognize that normally blameworthy actions could be 
justified.  A morally just system must be able to differentiate situations where an 
otherwise punishable action could be justified that not only would lessen guilt, but 
would actually excuse it entirely. 
It is important to note that not all punishment systems must treat these 
situations identically to be considered morally credible, rather they must be able to 
express the communally shared value of what situations or circumstances that 
would excuse conduct.  For instance, the debate over killings by police is a 
struggle over the question of when homicide can be excused.  Are police receiving 
a different standard for consideration of using deadly force when feeling 
threatened when compared to the public, and, if so, should this treatment be 
justified?66 Similarly, “stand your ground” laws reflect at least a state legislature’s 
view on when force can be used in self-defense.67 
 
E. What Is Meant by Arbitrariness? 
 
Finally, in order for the criminal justice system to have moral credibility, the 
punishment regime must not be arbitrary.68  If two people are committing the same 
crime, under the desert theory they both should be treated the same.  If, for 
example, the punishment regime becomes one that is focused on “other factors” 
the system of punishment becomes arbitrary and loses its legitimacy.69  For 
example, Robinson criticizes the incapacitation-based sentencing system because it 
takes other factors into account for its distribution of liability, such as race, gender, 
and age.  Thus, someone who committed the same offense could be held to a 
greater sentence based on other extraneous factors that have no bearing on the 
offender’s moral blameworthiness.70 
Moreover, as Vincent Chiao posits: “A desert-sensitive, and hence 
nonarbitrary, distribution of punishment is one that punishes those who are 
                                                                                                                                 
66  See Daniel Lathrop & Anna Flagg, Killings of Blacks by Whites Are Far More Likely to Be 
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(legally) deserving, and in proportion to their desert.  A desert-insensitive 
distribution of punishment is one that exhibits significant misfit between imposed 
punishment and comparative desert.”71  Much scholarship has surrounded the 
arbitrariness of the death penalty, and how the capital punishment system must 
remain fair and equal amongst offenders to be considered legitimate.72  Thus, when 
the criminal justice system is not treating offenders with the same blameworthiness 
equally, and taking into consideration factors that may be morally suspect, such as 
race or class, the system becomes arbitrary and loses its moral credibility.  The 
actions of the criminal justice system must be in furtherance of the underlying 
justifications for punishment.73 
Arbitrariness is not defined in the narrow context, i.e. situations whereby 
outcomes are not consistent or fail to follow any rationale, but rather arbitrariness 
includes outcomes that are driven by what the community would view as 
illegitimate considerations—such as wealth and race.  All class-based or race-
based outcomes would be considered arbitrary because the punishment would not 
be related to the actual conduct being controlled. 
In order for a punishment to be considered morally credible (substantively 
legitimate) it must reflect values of proportionality, be able to distinguish between 
the innocent and the guilty, and the punishment must not be arbitrary through 
unfair or discriminatory enforcement practices. 
 
II. HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS OF DEPORTATION AND DETENTION LACK 
MORAL CREDIBILITY 
 
Aside from the death penalty, there are few sanctions that are more severe and 
feared than deportation and incarceration.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
“[d]eportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’”74  The 
Court also described avoiding incarceration as the “[i]nterest in securing that 
freedom, the freedom ‘from bodily restraint,’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty 
                                                                                                                                 
71  Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
277, 281 (2012). 
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protected by the Due Process Clause.’”75  Yet, the modern deportation system 
dispenses with sanctions freely and with increasing regularity.  The current rate of 
deportations in the last decade (2008–2018) not only exceeds the rate in any other 
decade, but in the entirety of the history of the United States.76  In other words, 
there have been more people deported in the last ten years, than all of the years that 
preceded 2008.77  The rate of immigration detention is no less alarming.  With 
nearly 43,000 people detained on any given day and over 400,000 people detained 
by ICE in the last year, immigration detention has become the single largest system 
of incarceration in the country.78  As alarming and remarkable as the sheer 
numbers may appear, it is not numbers alone that has caused the modern 
deportation system to lose moral credibility.  Deportation as a sanction has little 
flexibility, and its costs on individuals vary greatly based on factors outside of the 
imposing system—deportation to a country marked by violence, corruption, or 
even illness can be markedly different than deportation to a stable, prosperous and 
peaceful nation.  While incarceration and detention in the criminal context can be 
flexible, its use in the immigration setting has transformed the process itself into a 
type of punishment—much as the use of pre-trial detention in the misdemeanor 
court system in Connecticut described by Malcolm Feeley did in the late 1970s.79 
In this section, two features of the immigration system, crime based 
deportation and immigration detention, are examined on their ability to account for 
and address communal notions of culpability and arbitrariness.  Under these 
measurements, the immigration regime of removal fails miserably, as the current 
system not only is unable to conform to the moral imperatives of a just 
punishment, but wholly ignores them altogether. 
 
A. Deportation 
 
There are essentially three different categories of “offenses” that can result in 
one’s deportation.  These different categories of offenses are what lead to the 
sanction of deportation.  The first is entering the United States without engaging in 
the proper procedures or in violation of those procedures.  This doesn’t just include 
border crossers, but can also include those who enter using false documentation or 
                                                                                                                                 
75  Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 
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through the use of fraud.80  The second categorical group would include those who 
violate the explicit or implicit conditions of their entry.  Explicit conditions include 
honoring time limits, or conditions on employment,81 while implicit conditions 
would include crime-based removals.82  The third category of offenses that can 
result in deportation are those who do not violate any procedures of entry, but are 
nonetheless found to not warrant entry.  This category is extremely limited as most 
determinations of desirability for entry are made prior to physical arrival—the lone 
exception are those who seek refuge at our ports of entry.83  These categories do 
not conform to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA’s”) own system that 
attempts to separate people into those “seeking admission” (which is how the 
statute treats undocumented border crossers)84 from those who are being 
“deported.”85 
 
1. Proportionality & Culpability 
 
The result of finding oneself, often against one’s will, in a country that one 
either deliberately chose to leave or does not consider one’s home, can either be 
inconvenient or a death sentence.  It is this wide range of effects coupled with the 
binary aspect of deportation itself—what Juliet Stumpf describes as an “on-off” 
switch86—that makes the sanction of deportation fail the test of proportionality.  It 
is this binary nature—either one is deported or one is not, that makes it extremely 
difficult to meet the proportionality requirement. 
As described above, deportation is the result of various different types of 
offenses, all of which can be viewed as having different levels of moral liability.  
While spies and those who threaten national security can be deported,87 so can 
those who overstayed their visa by a week or even a day.88  The severity of the 
offense has no effect on the level of punishment since there is only a single level of 
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punishment available.89  This scheme on its face violates the maxim that the 
“punishment shall fit the crime.” 
Even when accounting for potential relief from removal, deportation cannot 
adjust to different levels of harm and immoral behavior.  For instance, within the 
first category of offenses, a person can be deported for using fake documentation 
or fraud.90  However, there exists a fraud waiver which can be employed if one can 
show hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful Permanent Resident family member.91  
For those who can show such a hardship, deportation can be avoided.  Yet, because 
many forms of relief are exclusively concerned with hardship to a relative who 
happens to have citizenship, it doesn’t actually change the sanction based on the 
nature of the offense.92  In other words, two virtually identical people may commit 
the exact same offense, for the exact same reasons, and yet one will avoid 
deportation based on his or her relationship to a person who would suffer harm.  
This is common with forms of relief and a large reason why relief does not 
normally affect proportionality.93 
Even the availability of relief does not often have a relationship to the 
blameworthiness of the offense involved.  For instance, two lawful permanent 
residents may commit the same crime, an aggravated felony, but one entered the 
United States first as a student before getting their green card, while the other may 
have entered the United States with a Green Card after marrying a U.S. Citizen 
abroad.  The first lawful Permanent Resident would be eligible for a 212(h) 
waiver, allowing him or her to show hardship to a citizen or permanent resident 
                                                                                                                                 
89  While one common critique of immigration violators is the general notion that the blame 
attaches to the violation of any set of immigration laws, i.e. “lawbreakers” this critique in this context 
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others. 
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(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)) (2012) (waiver). 
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relative, while the second would not be.94  Moreover, because relief from removal 
is extremely restricted, there is little opportunity overall for any relief to inject 
proportionality.95 
Proportionality is a function not just of calibrating the punishment to the 
blameworthiness of an offense, but also the severity of the penalty to different 
individuals.96  Would deportation for one person mean a punishment of a 
completely different nature and severity than deportation for another?  The answer 
is clearly yes.  First, because deportation’s effects depend on the citizenship of the 
deportee, deportation as a sanction means different things to different people.  The 
New Yorker reported on how some deportations are death sentences.97  For some, 
deportation may either be temporary, or somewhat inconsequential (i.e. a migrant 
with few ties in the United States who never intended to create lasting roots).  The 
deportation system rarely takes into account the pain and suffering of actual 
deportation, and in fact when judging the necessary hardship required for certain 
forms of relief, makes a point of distinguishing the normal attendant harsh 
consequences of deportation from “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardships 
necessary to waive deportation.98 
The lack of proportionality is also evident with criminal-based deportation.  
Because crime-based deportation is often a direct consequence of committing a 
criminal offense,99 proportionality should be judged from the overall combination 
of sanctions—both criminal and deportation.100  However, because U.S. citizen 
criminals are legally immune from deportation and banishment as a sanction for 
criminal activity,101 this necessarily creates a disproportionate situation.  This 
                                                                                                                                 
94  See In re J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2015) (discussing the key eligibility factor as 
whether a person entered with lawful permanent resident status or obtained it after entry into the 
United States). 
95  See Stumpf, supra note 20, at 1703. 
96  See Part I(2)(a) and accompanying text for a greater understanding of how proportionality 
is measured. 
97  See Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 15, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence. 
98  At first glance the application of asylum and protection-based relief, such as withholding of 
removal under INA § 241(b)(3) or the CAT Convention may alleviate those concerns, but it is 
important to note that the “persecution” necessary for asylum or withholding of removal is a technical 
term that is not necessarily related to level of suffering.  For instance, the potential for death, severe 
poverty, and displacement do not automatically qualify as persecution.  Similarly, torture is not just a 
general term, but a technical one that requires governmental action.  This is why people fleeing 
countries with high crime or poverty rates may be unable to seek protection inside the United States. 
99  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010). 
100 Maureen Sweeney & Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for 
Crimes, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 11, 15–16 (2011). 
101 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  Despite this legal immunity, the removal of U.S. 
citizens is not an uncommon occurrence. 
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imbalance has severe consequences for all criminal justice systems that regularly 
have non-citizen defendants, but different jurisdictions have reacted differently.  
For example, judges, police, and prosecutors in a jurisdiction that recognizes 
deportation as part of the overall punishment for a crime may be more willing to 
consider alternatives to charging and sentencing for non-citizens than for U.S. 
citizens.  Professor Ingrid Eagly describes how different criminal justice systems 
have attempted to adjust to prosecuting non-citizens at risk of deportation.102  
Because the immigration consequence at issue—deportation—is so inflexible, the 
only way to adjust for proportionality is in the criminal justice system.  This is one 
reason why Professor Gabriel Chin argues that consideration of immigration status 
may be proper in the criminal justice arena.103 
Moreover, the lack of proportionality in terms of adjudication of deportation 
has caused Professor Jason Cade to observe that the only effective means of 
injecting proportionality or “equity” into the removal system comes from 
enforcement actors such as ICE and the attorneys working for ICE as 
“prosecutors.”104  As a consequence of a lack of judicial discretion and overly 
harsh laws, measures such as prosecutorial discretion105 and enforcement 
discretion106 become critical in order to achieve proportional results and avoid 
outcomes that are morally repugnant.  In other words, proportionality only comes 
into play in deciding who is subject to the system in the first place, which is why 
power is disproportionally placed with the gatekeepers, as such local enforcement 
officers, and local ICE attorneys.  Besides requiring flexibility that takes into 
account varying grades of blameworthiness, how to decide whether 
blameworthiness attaches at all is another feature of moral credibility.  Innocent 
actors are subject to deportation.  Any system of punishment, whether criminal or 
not, must decide what circumstances or situation can excuse an offense.  Murder is 
a prime example where the offense, the deliberate killing of another human being, 
can nonetheless be excused by a showing of either self-defense or defense of 
others.  In rare situations, a category of people may be excused from liability as 
well, for instance, as mentioned above, the federal system also categorically 
exempts a group of people from criminal liability altogether—namely children 
under a certain age.107  In the culpability context, federal law consensus is that 
                                                                                                                                 
102 Eagly, supra note 49, 1157–90 (describing three models of non-citizen criminal justice: 
“alien-neutral,” “illegal alien punishment,” and “immigration enforcement.”). 
103 Gabriel Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and 
the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1459 (2011). 
104 Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2014). 
105 Id. 
106 Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (2015). 
107 Depending on the crime involved, the floor may be as high as fifteen years of age but the 
absolute floor for the federal system is thirteen years of age.  See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). 
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children are not culpable under a certain age and therefore, cannot be subject to 
criminal liability.108 And yet, deportation law is applied not just to children, but 
infants and toddlers as well.109 
Media, politicians and commentators often start the discussion on DREAMers 
by describing them as “being brought to the United States,”110 which is in direct 
contrast with the description of unauthorized migration and border crossing.  This 
passive voice is just one way that identifies a lack of culpability for DREAMers, 
actions.  These children, who entered the United States without documentation, did 
so in a variety of means and vastly ranged in age, from newborns to teenagers.111  
Public opinion currently views deportation for this group as unjust.  For example, a 
poll conducted in September of 2017 found that nearly 86% supported this group’s 
ability to avoid deportation.112  Despite the strong public support, DREAMers 
continue to be deported, both before the dissolution of DACA and after.113  While 
DACA protected a specific group of children, its reach did not extend to everyone 
whose violation of immigration law occurred as children.  People over the age of 
30 when the program began in 2012 were ineligible,114 and children brought after 
                                                                                                                                 
108 But see, Underage Prosecution, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/children-
prison/underage-prosecution (last visited Aug. 27, 2018). 
109 Jerry Markon, Can a 3-year Old Represent Herself in Immigration Court?  This Judge 
Thinks So., WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/can-a-3-year-old-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinks-
so/2016/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f-1d10062cc82d_story.html?utm_term=.d3802a64fe11. 
110 Maya Rhodan, ‘You Created the Crisis.’ The Fight with President Trump Over Dreamers 
Heats Up, TIME (Jan. 2, 2018), http://time.com/5084283/defend-daca-immigration-trump-democrats/ 
(“In a tweet Tuesday morning, Trump accused Democrats of empty posturing on protecting 
undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children”); Catherine E. Shoichet, Susannah 
Cullinane & Tal Kopan, US Immigration: DACA and Dreamers Explained, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017, 
2:13PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/04/politics/daca-dreamers-immigration-program/index.html 
(“These are undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children, a group 
often described as Dreamers.”) (emphasis added); Dara Lind, 9 Facts that Explain DACA, the 
Immigration Program Trump is Ending, VOX (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/8/31/16226934/daca-trump-dreamers-immigration (“unauthorized immigrants brought 
to the US.”). 
111 The breadth and range of such stories for undocumented youth can be found at different 
organization’s story archives such as this one maintained by UNITED WE DREAM, 
https://unitedwedream.org/category/stories/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
112 Scott Clement & David Nakamura, Survey Finds Strong Support for ‘Dreamers’, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/survey-finds-strong-support-for-
dreamers/2017/09/24/df3c885c-a16f-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html?utm_term=.f95f7f957aee. 
113 Alan Gomez & David Agren, First Protected DREAMer Is Deported Under Trump, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/18/first-
protected-dreamer-deported-under-trump/100583274/. 
114 Jose Antonio Vargas, the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist is one of those who despite 
arriving as a child, was ineligible for DACA protections as he was over the age of 30 when it was 
announced.  Elise Foley, Jose Antonio Vargas Among Undocumented Immigrants Making Urgent 
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the program was announced were also ineligible.  Despite this executive decision 
to inject some proportionality into the deportation regime, it falls woefully short.  
Both the executive actions and proposed legislative fixes only look at dealing with 
past offenses and do not alleviate deportation for new childhood arrivals.115 
Personal characteristics, such as age or illness, can excuse otherwise culpable 
conduct.  The immigration parallel to duress and self-defense justifications for 
criminal violations is those seeking protection from violence at our ports of entry.  
As discussed above, deportation of asylum seekers—even those who are in 
compliance with both international and domestic law—is allowed by the current 
system.  A person who fears persecution may arrive at a port of entry to the United 
States and apply for asylum.  This usually begins the “expedited removal” process 
where the person is treated as an applicant for admission under INA § 235.116  To 
avoid deportation, this individual must pass a credible fear interview and be 
granted asylum by an immigration judge.  Deportation can result if the person is 
unable to: (1) pass the credible fear examination, or (2) meet their burden for 
asylum in front of an immigration judge.  At this point the applicant has not 
violated any immigration law, crossed a border without authorization, or violated 
any conditions of entry, but they can still be deported.  These applicants were 
simply found to not warrant admission into the United States, and frustratingly, 
because the process of seeking asylum requires physical presence, any rejection of 
an asylum claim117 will result in deportation.  If the applicant is unable to meet the 
technical or substantive requirements of asylum, current law allows for their 
deportation even if the applicant fled their country due to concerns for their well-
being and safety.  These blameless actors are punished with deportation to the 
country from which they fled.118 
                                                                                                                                            
Plea to Obama, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2014, 9:06 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/20/jose-antonio-vargas-executive-action_n_5693187.html 
(describing why Vargas and a South Korean child’s arrival were too old at the time of the 
pronouncement despite having arrived as children). 
115 Cade, supra note 104, at 683–87 (discussing the role of executive programs like DACA as 
providing an important outlet to reach equitable outcomes). 
116 INA § 235 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (2012)). 
117 Asylum can be rejected on a myriad of procedural defects and technical requirements.  A 
person can be found to have a credible fear of pain, injury, or even death, and still not qualify for 
asylum. 
118 Another group that should be mentioned is asylum seekers from Central America.  The fact 
that overwhelming violence in their own countries is driving them to seek refuge in the U.S. is 
undisputed.  Nonetheless, as Attorney General Sessions ruled, in his view asylum should not be 
extended to people fleeing gang violence.  This group is “blameless” and yet, because the AG has 
ruled asylum is beyond their reach, are subject to deportation and detention. 
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2. Arbitrary or Illegitimate Rationale 
 
Just punishment is one that follows an understandable and “moral” rationale.  
While culpability and proportionality are aspects of this rule, punishment must 
actually serve the purpose of expressing shared moral values.  It should not be the 
result of chance, or even worse, the product of morally repugnant goals.  For 
instance, legal realists critique judicial decisions as the result of the mood of the 
judge or jury (“what the judge ate that morning”)119 rather than the careful 
application of the law.  Similarly, punishment that is dependent on luck, or factors 
that are not connected to blame, such as poverty120 or logistical concerns, can be 
viewed as morally questionable.  In fact, this is one critique of the utilitarian 
rationale by retributionists—if punishment is based on resources, then it is morally 
suspect.121  Arbitrariness can also come from the perception that a system is not 
only unable to articulate the moral judgement of a community, but also produces a 
morally unacceptable result.  The most prominent, and perhaps most devastating, 
criticism of the American criminal justice system is its racial disparities and the 
perception that it functions as a tool for racial subjugation.122  When a criminal 
justice system captures and punishes a disproportionate percentage of people of 
color, the system loses moral credibility.123  Sadly, deportation is vulnerable to the 
same critique. 
Professor Vasquez argues that immigration law generally, including the law 
and practice of deportation, has become a tool of racial subjugation of Latinos.124  
She convincingly shows how not only the sheer numbers of Latinos subject to 
removal are disproportionate—over 90% of all removals in 2012 were of 
Latinos—but that the history of deportation and criminal laws created the criminal 
                                                                                                                                 
119 WILLIAM W. FISHER III ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at vi, xiv (1993).  (“The Realist 
credo is often caricatured as the proposition that how a judge decides a case on a given day depends 
primarily on what he or she had for breakfast . . . [b]ut most of their writings on the character of 
adjudication and on other issues were vastly more sophisticated . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
120 Alabama Town Agrees in Settlement to Stop Operating Debtors’ Prison, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY LAW CENTER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/03/14/alabama-town-
agrees-settlement-stop-operating-debtors%E2%80%99-prison. 
121 Robinson & Darley, supra note 37 (critiquing the Supreme Court’s decision to convict a 
person who many would view as blameless, though dangerous). 
122 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 
(1988). 
123 The citations here would be too numerous to adequately capture, but perhaps a single 
citation would do.  Samuel H. Pillsbury, Black Lives Matter, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567 (2016). 
124 Yolanda Vazquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” 
World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2015). 
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alien as Latino.125  Others have also noted how the result of “Juan Crow” laws 
create mass racialized deportations.126 
Another example of an arbitrary result is seen when people can avoid 
deportation for reasons untethered to blame.  Citizens of certain countries may be 
able to avoid the sanction of deportation, not because they are less blameworthy, 
but because their country refuses to accept them.  For example, Cuba has been on a 
list of “recalcitrant” countries, which are countries that do not cooperate fully in 
accepting deportees.127  Essentially, while a Cuban may go through the exact same 
process for deportation as a Mexican and have an immigration judge declare him 
to be “removable” and not eligible for relief from deportation, the Cuban will not 
be deported while the Mexican will be.  These disparate results based on 
nationality and politics drive home the notion that the sanction of deportation—in 
this case, the actual physical removal from the United States—is driven by 
arbitrary factors, and not by legitimate and cogent rules on moral conduct. 
Another feature of arbitrariness is when the people punished do not 
understand either the reason or system of punishment.  The law that governs 
deportation is overly technical and has a non-intuitive application.  As such, the 
results often do not make sense to either the people made to suffer them or to the 
public.  One of the most difficult, confusing, and litigious areas in deportation law 
is removal based on criminal conduct.  Even as federal statutes increased the 
categories of removal for crimes, the methodology of figuring out what state 
convictions lead to detention has proven to be difficult.  The biggest example of 
this problem has been applying what the Court has called the “categorical 
approach.”  This approach, coined in modern Supreme Court usage in the 
sentencing case Taylor v. United States,128 attempts to tie immigration 
consequences to the language of the state statute of conviction.  While seemingly 
straightforward, the “categorical approach” has generated enough litigation and 
confusion that in the latest pronouncement of it, Justice Breyer complained that 
“What was once a simple matter will produce a time-consuming legal tangle.”129  
                                                                                                                                 
125 Id. at 650 (“Through the label of the “criminal alien,” the law legitimates the exclusion and 
exploitation of Latinos, thereby, ensuring their subordination and marginal status.”). 
126 See Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate 
Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993 (2016); Sheldon Novick, 
Citizenship Is Not the Only Goal: Reform Should Bring an End to Mass Deportations, 27 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 517 (2013) (citing to Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2012 (Sunday Review).  See also Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered 
Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 
(2010). 
127 Alan Neuhauser, DHS Seeks Sanctions on Countries That Refuse Deportees, US NEWS 
(Aug. 23, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-08-23/dhs-
seeks-sanctions-on-countries-that-refuse-to-accept-deportees. 
128 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
129 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2264 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The categorical approach itself can lead to critiques of arbitrariness because it 
treats the state definition of statutes, not actual conduct, as controlling.  For 
instance, a person convicted of burglary in a state that defines burglary to include 
entering a vehicle as well as a building, may avoid deportation even if he entered a 
residence and stole a television.  At the same time, a defendant who commits the 
exact same burglary in a state that narrowly defines burglary can not only be 
deported, but also can be ineligible for various forms of relief.  While there are 
good reasons to commit to the use of the categorical approach, these reasons are 
difficult to translate to the public or deportees. 
While many forms of relief from deportation appear to try and give some 
weight to the expression of moral values, such as rehabilitation130 and harm 
avoidance, the extreme technical qualifications of the relief make the process 
opaque and nearly impossible for most to understand.  For instance, the main form 
of relief from deportation, for an otherwise removable person, is contained in INA 
§ 240A, and is called “Cancellation of Removal.”  The general contours of the 
relief appear easy enough, for lawful permanent residents it requires: (1) five years 
of lawful permanent residency, and (2) for the LPR to have resided in the United 
States for seven years after having been “admitted” in any lawful status.  For non-
lawful permanent residents, applicants must show: (1) 10 years of continuous 
residency, and (2) hardship to a US Citizen or lawful permanent resident relative.  
Even if one objects to the length of the residency requirements, the requirement is 
understandable and fits the idea that the longer one lives in the United States, the 
more they should be given a chance to stay.  However, the statute does not allow 
for an easy or simple reading of “continuous residency,” instead it employs what it 
describes as the “Stop-Time Rule.”  This rule essentially states that certain crimes, 
not all crimes and not even all of the “deportable” crimes, can upon commission 
(and not conviction), prevent a person from accruing additional time as a 
resident.131  So, if a person who has lived in the United States for 26 years, 
commits an “inadmissibility crime” (but not one that qualifies as a petty offense)132 
by year six of their residency, the years they live in the United States afterwards do 
not “count” for purposes of deciding eligibility for Cancellation of Removal.  This 
sort of technical and seemingly randomly constructed eligibility requirement 
heightens rather than diminishes the arbitrary nature of deportation. 
Immigration relief also requires immigration judges to exercise discretion in 
its application.  While some commentators decried the lack of discretion for relief 
when Congress set much stricter requirements in 1996 as part of the massive 
                                                                                                                                 
130 See INA § 212(h) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)); INA § 240A(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(a) (2012)); Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978) (explaining how discretionary relief 
includes consideration of rehabilitation). 
131 See INA § 240A(d)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(d)(1) (2012)). 
132 Matter of Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 2010). 
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immigration overhaul,133 individual discretion can often lead to more arbitrary 
results.  Professors Ramji-Nogales and Schrag discuss in great detail how asylum 
determinations are often controlled not by the law or careful consideration of the 
facts, but on which immigration judge is hearing the case.134  As different judges 
may hold widely different views on issues, such as harm that can rise to 
“persecution,”135 what groups may be considered “socially distinct,”136 and finally 
considering credibility determinations across cultures.  Additionally, relief such as 
Cancellation of Removal asks judges to consider whether a person has been 
rehabilitated properly, has shown remorse, and whether the hardships faced by 
family members may rise to the level of “extreme and unusual.”137  These 
exercises in discretion can result in widely disparate results and therefore increase 
the likelihood of imposing arbitrary punishment. 
At various times policymakers have attempted to use two main justifications 
for deportation: non-citizens increase crime and cause economic harm.  However, 
both of these justifications have been thoroughly repudiated by detailed 
evidence.138  Moreover, the justification for the use of deportation becomes even 
more difficult when its usage has not led to reductions sought.139  This leads to a 
cognitive mismatch in trying to justify the harsh sanctions of deportation. 
The punishment of deportation fails miserably in expressing commonly held 
views of justice.  Deportation is not applied in a proportionate manner, as its binary 
nature does not allow it to consider different gradations of culpability.  Yet, many 
who the public would consider blameless when it comes to criminal liability are 
still subject to deportation.  Finally, deportation through its complex and opaque 
                                                                                                                                 
133 Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created Today’s Immigration 
Problem, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-
immigration. 
134 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Jaya Ramji-Nogales & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2008). 
135 See Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A determinative 
definition of ‘persecution’ has proven elusive.  There is no statutory definition; nor has the BIA 
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136 Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). 
137 INA § 240A(b). 
138 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY (2017), 
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http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2016/1/27/the-effects-of-immigration-on-the-united-
states-economy. 
139 Ryo, supra note 27.  See also Tanya Golash-Boza, The Immigration Industrial Complex: 
Why We Enforce Immigration Policies Destined to Fail, 3 SOC. COMPASS 295 (2009); Douglas S. 
Massey, Jorge Durand & Karen A. Pren, Why Border Enforcement Backfired, 121 AM. J. SOC. 1157 
(2016). 
2018] UNJUST DESERTS 131 
rules, its disparate racial impact, its inability to deport those from certain countries, 
and its inability to articulate the harms it seeks to redress, all lead to the inevitable 
conclusion that as it stands, deportations are unjust and morally incredible. 
 
B. Detention 
 
Aside from deportation which is the overt or expressed “punishment” 
imposed by the deportation system, the use of detention is also a punishment or 
penalty that the government extracts from non-citizens.  For example, César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández writes that immigration detention is punishment by 
referencing the legislative intent of imposing immigration detention and its 
intertwining with the concurrent rise in mass incarceration on the War on Drugs.140  
Other commentators have noted that the sanction of detention, especially 
mandatory detention, is sufficiently harsh and even punitive that the right to 
counsel should attach to its usage.141  This article does not dispute that the use of 
immigration detention is punitive in nature and is punishment and sanction every 
bit as much as deportation.  The article question examines whether it is morally 
credible—whether it accounts for values such as culpability and proportionality 
and whether its usage is arbitrary or unjust.  I conclude that immigration detention, 
like its cousin pre-trial criminal custody, fails the criteria for moral credibility. 
 
1. Proportionality & Culpability 
 
There are several features of immigration detention that lay bare its inability 
to account for culpability.  First, the use of categorical denials of release from 
custody—including those who only seek to apply for protection in the country, 
without individualized determination, makes the decisions on detention wholly 
independent from an individual’s blameworthiness.  Second, the interpretation by 
the agency that detains, and not the government, must bear the burden to prove a 
lack of dangerousness, which leads to default incarceration of the innocent.  
Finally, the length of immigration detention is divorced from the severity of the 
immigration offense and, is instead, tied to the willingness of the detainee to 
exercise his or her statutory right to fight deportation and remain in the United 
States.142 
The application of categorical rules to detention—without the possibility of 
release—has been the subject of a variety of critiques.  Most of these critiques 
                                                                                                                                 
140 Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, supra note 21. 
141 See Note, ‘A Prison Is a Prison Is a Prison’: Mandatory Immigration Detention and the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 129 HARV. L. REV 522 (2015). 
142 This applies to both mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) and detention prior to 
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have focused on the lack of due process.143  In 1996, Congress adopted a set of 
rules whereby people who have been convicted of certain crimes are ineligible to 
request release from detention.  Essentially, Congress has decided that an entire 
category of people is too dangerous for release.144  Allowing detention without 
individualized determinations, a situation almost never found in either criminal or 
civil law, are not just challenges to the constitutional notions of due process, but 
can also be reframed as objections to the lack of proportionality.  Proportionality 
concerns could be limited if the categories deemed dangerous by Congress were 
narrowly drawn, as they were in the Bail Reform Act at issue in U.S. v. Salerno145 
where only the most serious crimes were targeted for denial of bail.  Yet, that is not 
the case with mandatory detention in the deportation scheme. 
The statute controlling mandatory detention lists four different subsections 
that describe when a person is unable to apply for bond.  Some of these categories 
are extremely broad in nature; for instance, the statute states it “is inadmissible by 
reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2).”146  Section 
212(a)(2) describes crimes involving moral turpitude, which by itself covers a vast 
number of crimes, and the Agency has begun to expand the definition in the last 
few years.  However, this section also refers to any controlled substance violation 
(including misdemeanor marijuana convictions), and anyone who has benefitted 
from human smuggling or is suspected of being a drug trafficker, even if they have 
not been convicted of a crime.  The inclusion of crimes involving moral turpitude 
describes conduct with blameworthiness ranging from shoplifting147 to rape.148  
What is remarkable about this list of crimes that warrant mandatory detention is 
how few criminal grounds of removal do not make this list.  For instance, anyone 
who has not been admitted, but may be removable for a crime, can be detained.  
For those who are admitted, the exceptions are rare, but include removal based on 
domestic violence, child abuse, and human trafficking.149  The exclusion of 
domestic violence, child abuse, and human traffickers from the list of mandatory 
detention makes it even clearer that blameworthiness plays no role in deciding 
categorical detention. 
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However, categorical or mandatory detention is not the only means by which 
culpability or blameworthiness is ignored.  Under the general detention statute, 
INA § 236(a), the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has, in a line of cases 
beginning in 1999,150 ruled that it is the detained who must bear the burden of 
proving a lack of dangerousness or flight risk.  There is a myriad of problems with 
this burden shift,151 but one core problem has been that this shift means that if non-
dangerous, and people with little to no flight risk, are unable to meet their burden, 
they cannot be released.  This detention by default situation punishes people who 
may be blameless, but simply unable to prove their lack of culpability due to 
resource constraints.152 
Proportionality in the incarceration context is usually related to the length of 
time a person may have to spend confined.  More serious conduct results in longer 
sentences and periods of confinement.  Immigration detention, similar to pre-trial 
detention in the criminal court, has a much stronger relationship with one’s desire 
to stay in the United States.  If a detainee fights their removal, and attempts to 
apply for relief from detention, the length of confinement increases proportionally.  
For instance, the Transactional Access Records Clearinghouse provides statistics 
on the length of detention for those confined facing removals based on why they 
were released.  The shortest time in custody belonged to those who were removed 
or voluntarily departed from the country.  The longest period of time was for those 
who ended up staying in the United States—either because the immigration judge 
“terminated” their case (i.e. found that they should not have been removed in the 
first place), or that they “won” relief to stay in the U.S. 153  This sort of cost 
extraction for exercising one’s right to try and remain in the United States recalls 
one of the most influential sociological examination of a criminal system in The 
Process is the Punishment.154 
Malcolm Feeley described a Connecticut misdemeanor court system in New 
Haven Connecticut and made the then-remarkable observation that first, none of 
the criminal defendants asked for trial, and second, people were perfectly willing 
to plead quickly in order to get out of the criminal system faster, regardless of 
blame.155  The parallel in the deportation regime is clear, if one does not “fight 
their removal” (i.e. “plead guilty”) then they would spend far less time in 
immigration detention—on average 127 more days, or four additional months 
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incarcerated.  For Feeley’s observations, the innocent who may want to fight their 
case would end up spending more time in jail.  Analogously, in the deportation 
regime, those with colorable, perhaps even strong claims, to stay in the United 
States are forced to spend more time in detention in order to go through the 
process.  In fact, deportation can have increased costs for those who want to assert 
their rights. 
For instance, even if an immigration judge decides that a person is not 
removable, or has decided that someone deserves relief from deportation, the 
government may appeal.156  If the person is detained, then detention would remain 
in place during the appeal.  An administrative appeal for a detained case can take 
on average more than three months.157  Once one accounts for the fact that a 
reversal on appeal rarely directly leads to release, but requires another set of 
hearings, one can see why the process to get released, and be able to stay in the 
United States once detained, can on average, reach 127 days.  Also, this process 
can often reach more than a year if there are circuit court appeals involved as well.  
While the pre-trial system for criminal courts can often rely on the Speedy Trial 
provision of the Constitution, no such parallel exists in the immigration side.  
Other practices, such as giving “credit” to defendants for time served before trial, 
helps alleviate the notion that time in detention has not relationship to blame, but 
only as a cost to assert one’s rights. 
 
2. Arbitrariness 
 
Many of the same factors that reveal deportation arbitrariness are also at play 
with immigration detention.  While immigration enforcement overall exhibits 
racial bias, immigration detention punishes the poor.  Immigration detention, 
especially for crime-based removal, punish people a second time, and often much 
more harshly than the criminal justice system. 
The practice of using bail in order to secure release from detention is an old 
one and has been part of the criminal justice process in the United States from 
common law, as evidenced by the Eighth Amendment’s bail clause provision.  
However, over the last few years, commentators have begun to recognize that this 
practice punishes poor people and is ineffective in addressing flight risk or 
dangerousness.158  Moreover, litigation in several different states has aimed to 
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remove the practice of cash bail.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
has ruled the setting of cash bail without consideration of ability to pay to be 
unconstitutional.159  Moreover, the Department of Justice in an amicus brief for 
litigation in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals supported the proposition that jailing 
people for being unable to make bail was unconstitutional.160  Even without 
litigation, the Cook County judicial system, by order of the Chief Judge Timothy 
Evans, has ordered that bond amounts must reflect the defendant’s ability to pay.161  
Furthermore, criminal justice systems that use pre-trial detention have begun to 
recognize that using cash as the means to ensure court appearances will punish 
people for simply being poor.  The pace of reform has increased quickly over the 
past couple of years.162 
The immigration system while importing the use of cash bail has not seen 
much in the way of reform with one prominent exception.  For immigration 
detention, unlike in the criminal setting where a judge must set a bail amount 
within the first 48 hours,163 custody determinations are decided by immigration 
officers who also run a “risk assessment” tool.  Mark Noferi and Roubert Koulish 
describe the adoption by ICE of an automated risk assessment tool, which is a 
system that attempts to use evidence based practices into creating an algorithm to 
accurately predict the risk of flight and dangerousness.164  These sort of tools, 
whose use has become widespread in the criminal justice system, face harsh 
criticism for continuing inherent biases and creating even more racial disparities.165  
Noferi and Koulish’s analysis found that close to 91% of all people are detained by 
ICE and only 4% are released on their own recognizance.166  The system, whether 
through the judgement of officers or use of a risk assessment tool over-detains.  As 
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Denise Gillman explains, “the process [immigration detention] adopts elements 
from the criminal pretrial system that are ill suited to the immigration setting, even 
while failing to incorporate lessons learned in the criminal justice context.”167  
While the criminal pre-trial system use of risk assessment has been critiqued, its 
damage is also limited given the criminal pre-trial default of release.  In contrast, 
the immigration system’s default requirement forces detainees to prove a lack of 
dangerousness, causing the default position to be detention; coupled with a cash 
bond system, this results in more people having to be detained than necessary.168 
Once a detention decision has been made, the cash bond system takes place 
for those not in mandatory detention.  The INA sets a statutory floor of $1,500 for 
a bond,169 which already far exceeds criminal bail amounts in misdemeanor 
settings.  The range on immigration bond amounts vary substantially and usually 
by the locality of the immigration courts, on the low end a median bond may be 
$5000, while on the high end a $15,000 bond is the median.170  While there has 
been no published precedent or regulation to the effect, immigration judges 
normally do not consider a person’s ability to pay, and even if they could, the 
$1,500 floor set by statute is binding.  The BIA has had unpublished opinions that 
vouch for this approach, even as the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”) EOIR Benchbook lists it as a factor.171  The practice throughout the 
nation still does not normally consider the ability to pay for immigration detainees 
and serves as a mechanism to punish the poor.172  Just as enforcement increases in 
racial disparity causes it to lose moral credibility, so does the practice of cash 
bonds that do not consider a detainee’s ability to pay. 
An important perspective on whether a system of punishment is arbitrary 
comes from those people punished.173  Emily Ryo interviewed immigrant detainees 
and discovered what their perceptions were of immigration detention.  If the 
punished view the system as random, this serves as a powerful indication that the 
system cannot meet its burden for moral credibility.  One of the main findings by 
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Ryo was how the detainees viewed their release decisions in immigration court as 
arbitrary.174 
According to immigration detainees, whether or not they could be released 
from detention was arbitrary.  As Ryo explains, “[i]t was a common refrain among 
detainees in discussing their bond hearings that they were either ‘lucky’ or 
‘unlucky’ in getting assigned to certain immigration judges.”175  Not only did 
detainees view bond decisions dependent on the judge, but also on what mood the 
judge was in, as one detainee put it, “It’s just the luck you have honestly . . . [t]he 
judge you get and how they’re feeling that day.”176  The detainees viewed that 
different judges’ personal views, for instance on issues such as DUIs, can be 
determinative of whether the judge would treat them fairly.  Detainees even 
believed that a judge’s demeanor and decision-making could vary on the same day 
because of prior cases on the docket that may make the judge more irritable or less 
likely to listen.177  These perspectives while important do not by themselves 
establish that judicial decisions on bond were in fact arbitrary, but they should be 
taken seriously, as detainees do have access to information and knowledge that few 
others do; even large studies using aggregate data may not contradict these 
perceptions.178  Moreover, because bond hearings are short, and often conducted 
without much evidence or preparation, there is good reason to think that any 
inherent bias by judges would be given full reign.179 
 
III. 
 
The deportation process is neither morally credible nor fair.  When a system 
of punishment is viewed by the community as lacking moral credibility, 
compliance with that system becomes much more difficult.180  A functional 
punishment system relies on voluntary communal compliance to not only the 
overall system, but to the norms set by punishment; in order for the government to 
stigmatize the offenses it wishes to punish.  This is a hallmark of punishment.181  
Not only would a punishment system without moral credibility have difficulty in 
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encouraging compliance, but it may foster resistance.  These effects are already on 
display and can be seen through local and state resistance to using local 
resources182 for immigration enforcement in what has been coined as the 
proliferation of sanctuary cities.  A deportation regime without moral credibility 
will be forced to exact societal control through brute force and will lack the ability 
to harness social interaction and shared mores to ensure compliance. 
The first step to restoring the deportation system’s moral credibility is to 
either abolish crime-based deportation or severely restrict its usage.  This idea, 
while seemingly radical, has attracted several advocates.  As Kari Hong explains, 
crime-based deportation was a relatively new legal phenomenon when Congress 
first passed a law taking away status from non-citizens in 1917.183  Even after 
Congress created crime-based deportation, only 7% of all deportations from 1908 
until 1986 were crime based.184  It was during the 1980s, during the War on Drugs, 
that saw the surge of criminal-based deportation (and relatedly the rise of 
immigration detention).185  In 1986, crime-based deportation was at 20%, in 1995 
50%, and in 2017 it was up to 56%.186  And in fiscal year 2017, ICE published a 
report in which more than 73% of arrests involved those with criminal 
convictions—though many of those were for traffic offenses and DUIs.  It is 
important to note that while ICE describes these as “criminal removals” their 
definition involves the removal of anyone with a criminal history, even if the crime 
is not the basis of removal.187  Using the deportation regime as a quasi-form of 
criminal control cannot be morally justified nor can it withstand scrutiny as means 
of deterrence or incapacitation. 
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Even as the public consensus appears to be that the deportation regime is 
unjust, those supporting mass deportation continue to use the rhetoric of 
criminality.188  The President’s campaign remarks have now morphed into policy 
from the Attorney General and the acting head of ICE.  The attempt by those who 
control the deportation regime to connect crime and immigration, which itself has 
a rich history,189 also attempts to use criminal law’s ability to stigmatize the 
deported.  However, one of the difficulties has been the increasing recognition of 
the criminal law’s own lack of moral credibility and how mass incarceration has 
undermined the criminal justice system’s ability to make moral judgements and 
create norms that are shareable by the community.  Kevin Johnson explains how 
using a deportation system that relies on a known racially-biased criminal justice 
system taints the deportation process altogether.190  Nonetheless, there is no 
question that the deportation regime relies on stigmas once associated with the 
criminal justice system—especially imprisonment.  “Immigration prisoners are 
thought to pose a public safety threat not because of any characteristics unique to 
them as individuals, but because they are imprisoned . . . [p]risons also stigmatize; 
they mark inmates as deviant and dangerous.”191  This is similarly reflected by 
those detained, as one of the respondents to Ryo’s survey explained, “Inside 
detention, it makes you feel like you are the worst criminal.  The most wanted of 
all.  You tell yourself, I’m not.  But that’s how they make you feel.”192  This 
disconnect between the unjust aspect of the deportation regime and attempts to 
continue to use the criminal justice as a proxy for immorality, or dangerousness, 
requires a reexamination of the use of detention in deportation. 
The moral hollowness of using deportation to punish non-citizen criminals 
rests on the proposition that punishing people twice for the same activity cannot be 
justified.  Leaving aside the argument that removal of non-citizen criminals is 
merely to expel the dangerous and unwanted members of the community, 
punishing non-citizens with deportation after punishing them in the criminal 
system violates proportionality per se.  As another one of Emily Ryo’s 
interviewees explain, “Why are you giving me more time . . . ?  I committed a 
crime, and I paid for it.”193  Even though Padilla v. Kentucky, made the jump and 
considered deportation as part of the penalty for a criminal punishment, it did not 
go on to realize its implications.  Thus, by creating crime-based deportations, the 
deportation regime ends up warping the criminal justice system. 
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One reason that the different municipalities in Ingrid Eagly’s study differed in 
their treatment of non-citizens has been their attempts to try to balance the 
implication that the criminal justice system essentially has become two-tiered.194  
While Gabriel Chin envisions the potential identification and acknowledgement of 
immigration status in criminal justice as compatible with notions of fairness, I do 
not.195  Professor Chin points out that there are various means in which the 
criminal justice process can create advantages and disadvantages for non-citizens, 
in both punishment and process.  I fear, however, that he does not properly address 
the fact that once deportation is considered part of the criminal penalty, it creates 
two different sentencing regimes.  Professor Chin’s premise is that criminal justice 
can properly balance the advantages of being a non-citizen with the disadvantage 
of vulnerability for deportation.  So, while he ably describes how non-citizens can 
be advantaged at sentencing to avoid deportation, how prosecutors and the courts 
can try and balance deportation as a factor for sentencing, he dismisses too easily 
the difficulty in comparing criminal sentences with deportation, and the 
information imbalance between criminal actors and the deportation system.196  For 
instance, while one criminal defendant could accept a longer sentence in prison 
(say 6 more months) if he were to avoid deportation, neither the criminal defendant 
nor the criminal judge could guarantee he could avoid deportation given how 
quickly the law changes in the realm of crimmigration.  While the last few years 
has seen the judiciary shrink the number of crimes and circumstances for 
deportation, the existence of IRIRA serves as a potent reminder that Congress can 
increase deportation liability for crimes and do so without worry of ex post facto 
protections.  Critically, criminal defendants are not particularly suited to gauging 
current dangers of criminal sentencing versus longer future dangers.  A criminal 
attorney can tell their clients that they risk deportation, but often defendants will 
not be willing to sit in criminal custody for the potential future benefit of avoiding 
deportation after release. 
The system becomes even more warped when immigration liability is no 
longer tied to criminal conviction, but simply criminal charges.  The recent 
memorandum on priorities for deportation focus on not just those who are 
convicted of a crime, but also for those charged with one.197  Under this scenario, 
the criminal system and its court actors have no ability to affect deportation 
decisions, unless the police are able to make determinations based on status at the 
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time of arrest, and there are powerful incentives to avoid having law enforcement 
officers to inquire about legal status as evidenced by sanctuary policies. 
Even if there are some potential for the criminal justice system to account for 
the disparate punishment faced by citizens versus non-citizens, the vast majority of 
time it will not occur.  The time and resource constraints that already strain the 
criminal system makes it difficult to assume that the necessary time and energy to 
properly calibrate the “costs” of deportation will be made.  Thus, the main 
contribution of Padilla is not to rebalance deportation as penalty, but to ensure that 
non-citizen criminal defendants have access to the necessary information. 
At the end, there is no running away from the simple conclusion that if 
deportation is “punishment” or even “quasi-punishment,” it is in the form of a 
second punishment and one that citizenship protects against.  “To allow 
immigration imprisonment to turn on a person’s citizenship, then, is effectively to 
incarcerate because of one’s outsider status, a characteristic that ought to be 
morally irrelevant.”198  While Hernández was describing immigration 
imprisonment, replacing the word “deportation” to replace the word “immigration 
imprisonment” or “incarcerate” does not change its meaning.  Allowing criminal- 
based removal is a clear and unsupportable recognition that non-citizens deserve 
more punishment for the same offense, a punishment that is constitutionally 
exempt from U.S. Citizens. 
Even if one were to reject the idea that deportation punishes criminal activity, 
the utilitarian perspective does not save crime-based deportation.  At the heart of 
the utility argument is the criminals, by virtue of being criminals, are dangerous 
and morally undesirable.  However, this proposition, even if that is the normative 
goal, no longer holds merit when examining the criminal justice system as a whole.  
As Hong explains: 
 
Immigration law’s current reliance on convictions does not ascertain who 
is dangerous and who is not and errs by rendering inconsequential, minor 
crimes to be treated the same as serious ones.  Instead of focusing just on 
offenders who are violent, the current scheme deems both a man who 
shoots a gun at a stranger to be as dangerous as a teenager who spat at a 
police officer during an arrest.199 
 
Essentially, because crimes have become so broad as to encompass activities that 
few would view as dangerous or requiring incapacitation, they become poor 
proxies themselves for dangerousness or immorality.  One example is the 
comparison of the criminal justice system’s treatment of the exact same defendant.  
Often the criminal justice system will sentence defendants to probation, 
diversionary programs, or minimal time in jail.  Yet, the immigration system will 
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use this as a basis for deportation.  For example, while possession of marijuana is 
often a misdemeanor offense that often results in only a fine, it can lead to 
deportation—even for lawful permanent residents if it occurs more than once.200  
Professor Hong argues that while criminal statutes are designed to sweep in both 
minor and serious conduct, because there is a reliance on criminal prosecutors 
exercising discretion, the deportation regime, and especially this Administration, 
does not believe that ICE should exercise much prosecutorial discretion at all.201 
Finally, what cannot be ignored is the racial illegitimacy that plagues the 
criminal justice system.  Even as scholars and jurists articulate the racist history 
and practices of the criminal justice system, it becomes difficult to justify decisions 
based on morality or dangerousness on determinations by the criminal law.  As 
Professor Hernández writes, 
 
Unless race is divorced from substantive criminal law as well as from 
choices about how and where to deploy police, asking only whether there 
exists enough evidence of criminal activity to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt will continue to ignore the vast trove of criminal 
activity that is not investigated or prosecuted.202 
 
Criminal-based removals result in racially-based removals.203  If markers by the 
criminal system are overbroad and terrible proxies for dangerousness, then their 
use in even a regulatory fashion where deportation is not “punishment” cannot be 
justified. 
Concerns involving the retention of power to expel dangerous or immoral 
non-citizens is overblown and ignores the institutions designed and in place to 
address danger.  Because incapacitation and punishment has already been assigned 
to the criminal justice system, and because non-citizens and citizens alike are 
within their jurisdictional purview, there is no reason to create another layer of 
“protection.”  If a non-citizen who commits a crime is too dangerous to be 
released, then it is the criminal justice system (or perhaps the civil commitment 
system for blameless offenders) that is tasked with making the decision on 
incapacitation and rehabilitation.  When the only difference between those who are 
deportable and those who are not is citizenship, then one must explain why 
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dangerous citizens are privileged over non-citizens.204  If the current justice system 
does a poor job of protecting us from dangerous non-citizens, then it is the criminal 
justice system that must reform.  Undercutting danger rationales are empirical 
studies show that our communities are at least as safe from non-citizens as they are 
from citizens.205  This is not to say that crimes should become irrelevant in 
immigration law, but at the very least it should only be one of many factors, rather 
than the main or sole factor, in deciding deportation questions. 
 
A. Detention 
 
The abolition of immigration detention was first proposed by Professor García 
Hernández in his paper, Abolishing Immigration Prisons.206  In his paper he traces 
the parallel tracks of immigration imprisonment with slavery, death penalty, and 
mass incarceration and essentially rests his argument for abolition on the 
connection between racism and immigration detention.  An institution founded on 
and perpetuating racial subjugation cannot be supported and must be abolished.207  
Just as crime based deportation is one of modern construct, so is immigration 
imprisonment.208  Professor García Hernández argues forcefully that immigration 
detention results in an unjustifiable destruction of Latinos.209 
Even if one were to ignore the racial impacts and history of immigration 
detention, it needs to be abolished for a more pragmatic reason—its use as 
punishment for the process of deportation distorts the ability of the immigration 
deportation process from providing a just or utilitarian result. 
In recent years, critics have begun to recognize the harms attendant on pre-
trial detention for criminally accused.  One aspect of this new recognition has been 
the previously discussed change in the use of cash bail, but the critique of pre-trial 
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detention goes far beyond just incarcerating the poor for being poor.210  Malcom 
Feeley in his seminal work, The Process is the Punishment,211 describes a 
misdemeanor court system where the ability to claim innocence extracts a much 
higher cost than pleading guilty.  When the criminal process becomes punitive, 
then it leads to situations where it no longer functions as a means to determine 
guilt from innocence, but rather as punishment by default for those who encounter 
law enforcement.  This same phenomenon exists with immigration detention. 
Just as pre-trial criminal detention is the “punishment” and imposes costs 
against the innocent, so it is with immigration detention.  As explained infra the 
immigration system can exacerbate these effects.  First, the range of time in 
immigration detention is often much more indeterminate and not often limited by 
statute.212  In fact, detainees explained to Ryo that it is this aspect of immigration 
detention that makes it seem harsher.213  While criminal pre-trial detainees may be 
held for lengthy periods of time, even in the face of the Speedy Trial clause, the 
pernicious effect of pre-trial detention is substantively on misdemeanors where the 
incentives to plead are much stronger.  Second, while the distorting effect for 
criminal pre-trial detention is the pleading of guilt by the innocent, the distortion in 
the deportation regime is more varied and can be fatal.  One of the current features 
of immigration detention is the imprisonment of those seeking protection in the 
United States from persecution as discussed infra.  Immigration detention 
incentivizes people to give up their claims for protection, even when the fate they 
face may include death.  There is a terrible irony associated with forcing those who 
flee persecution to spend time imprisoned before their claim can be recognized, but 
that is exactly what the deportation regime does.214  This effect is deliberately 
planned and even was one of the historical reasons for creating immigration 
imprisonment in the first place.215  People are unnecessarily forced to pay for the 
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possibility of sanctuary from death and violence with time in imprisonment and, 
recently, separation from their children. 
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly linked deportation to detention, its 
phrasing is deceptive.  For while it is true that the act of forcing a person from 
leaving the country against their will may require a deprivation of liberty, it is not 
true that detention is necessary at all prior to the determination of whether a person 
is allowed to stay in the United States.  In many cases, when a person is ordered 
removed and they are not already detained, ICE does not require detention upon 
the issuance of the final order of removal.  Instead, ICE can arrange for an 
individual’s deportation on a flight, or other mode of transportation and issue what 
has been deemed a “Bag and Baggage” letter, which is more formally known as a 
Form I-166 or notice to surrender for deportation.  This letter informs the deportee 
that they must report to ICE on a certain date and time for removal.  Usually the 
date is only the day before the flight, and the individual would only have to spend 
a single night in detention before being removed.  A morally credible deportation 
system that could invoke compliance could easily rely on people to report for 
removal when required.  In the criminal justice system, those released from 
detention during trial can often be given the opportunity, even after a conviction, to 
self-report for incarceration.  By imposing immigration’s version of pre-trial 
detention, the system punishes those who most wish to stay in the United States.  
This result is both unjust and unnecessarily cruel. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
On March 6, 2018, the United States Justice Department has decided to sue 
the State of California over what it has deemed to be sanctuary policies that, 
“obstruct the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law.”216  This 
clash between the federal government and California is the culmination of what 
happens when, at least according to the residents of the State of California, the 
deportation regime lacks moral credibility.  The federal governments continual 
attempts to justify increased immigration enforcement by using the stigma of 
catching “lawbreakers,” and criminals will likely meet increased resistance until 
they restore moral credibility to the deportation system overall. 
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